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Abstract 
Although ownership is acknowledged to exert a potent influence on various aspects of 
information processing, the origin of these effects remains largely unknown. Based on the 
demonstration that self-relevance facilitates perceptual judgments (i.e., the self-prioritization effect), 
here we explored the possibility that ownership enhances object categorization. The results of two 
experiments supported this prediction. Compared with items owned by a stranger (Expt. 1) or best 
friend (Expt. 2), those owned by the self were classified most rapidly (i.e., self-ownership effect) in an 
object-categorization task. To establish the basis of this effect, the processes underlying task 
performance were interrogated using a hierarchical drift diffusion model (HDDM) approach. Results 
of these analyses revealed that self-ownership was underpinned by a response bias (i.e., starting point 
of evidence accumulation). These findings explicate the origin of the ownership effect during object 
processing. 
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Exploring the Self-Ownership Effect: Separating Stimulus and Response Biases 
 
 Influencing core aspects of social-cognitive functioning, the self is a pivotal psychological 
construct. It guides cognition and action, shapes interpersonal relations, and provides stability and 
continuity to the flux of subjective experience (Baars, 1988; Gallagher, 2000; James, 1890; Kihlstrom 
& Klein, 1994; Neisser, 1988). As William James (1890) adroitly observed, the self lies at the center 
of mental life. Reflecting its fundamental status, the self is a topic that has fascinated scholars for 
centuries and continues to stimulate research and theorizing from diverse sections of the scientific 
community (e.g., Baumeister, 1998; Boyer, Robbins, & Jack, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; 
Gallagher, 2000; Gillihan & Farah, 2005; Heatherton, 2011; Heatherton, Macrae, & Kelley, 2004; 
James, 1890; Kilhstrom & Klein, 1994; Klein, Rozendal, & Cosmides, 2002; Markus & Nurius, 1986; 
Markus & Wurf, 1987). In recent years, this work has focused on two interrelated issues: (i) how the 
self influences cognition and decision-making; and (ii) identifying the neural correlates of self-
referential thought (e.g., Blakemore & Robbins, 2012; Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000; Heatherton, 2011; Heatherton et al., 2004; Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004; Sali, 
Anderson, & Courtney, 2016; Sheppard, Malone, & Sweeny, 2008; Wagner, Haxby, & Heatherton, 
2012). The message that emerges from this body of research is unequivocal — self-relevance exerts a 
potent influence on stimulus processing (Baumeister, 1998; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; 
Heatherton, 2011; Humphreys & Sui, 2015; Sui & Humphreys, 2015; Truong & Todd, in press). Quite 
how these effects arise, however, remains a matter of continued empirical scrutiny. 
 
Self-Reference and Memory 
 Although self-relevance is acknowledged to impact a range of cognitive outcomes (Baumeister, 
1998; Heatherton et al., 2011; Mezulis et al., 2004), most work has investigated memory function, 
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specifically how self-referencing (i.e., associating items with the self) influences recognition and recall 
(Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Heatherton et al., 2004; Symonds & Johnson, 
1997). Inspection of the attendant literature reveals a consistent finding. When recollecting the past, 
self-referential encoding affords material a reliable memorial benefit, the so-called self-reference effect 
(SRE, see Kelley et al., 2002; Macrae, Moran, Heatherton, Banfield, & Kelley, 2004; Maki & McCaul, 
1985; Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977; Symonds & Johnson, 1997). For example, following a task in 
which participants are required to rate the extent to which personality characteristics are descriptive of 
the self and others (e.g., celebrity, best friend), items (i.e., traits) encoded in the context of the self are 
typically advantaged in memory (i.e., self > other, see Rogers et al., 1977; Symonds & Johnson, 1997). 
This SRE has been attributed to the operation of accessible and elaborative self-constructs that serve to 
enrich stimulus representations, hence memory performance (e.g., Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 
1993; Klein & Loftus, 1988; Mather, Shafir, & Johnson, 2003; Symons & Johnson, 1997).  
 Importantly, the effects of self-referencing extend beyond the instructed evaluation of 
personality characteristics (cf. Kelley et al., 2002; Rogers et al., 1977). A substantial body of evidence 
reveals that ownership exerts comparable influence on judgment and memory. Specifically, owned (vs. 
not owned) objects are treated as psychological extensions of the self (Beggan, 1992; James, 1890), 
such that their appraisal is distorted by a host of self-serving biases (Belk, 1988, 1991, 2014). For 
example, exemplified by the ‘mere ownership’ effect, objects randomly assigned to the self (i.e., 
owned but not chosen by self) are deemed to be more desirable (Beggan, 1992; Belk, 1988, 1991) and 
valuable (i.e., endowment effect, Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Knetsch & Sinden, 1984; 
Morewedge & Giblin, 2015) than identical objects with no prior self-association. In addition, 
consistent with the SRE (Symons & Johnson, 1997), ownership also impacts memory performance. 
Numerous studies have documented a memorial advantage for items owned by the self (vs. other 
people), even when the basis of ownership is arbitrary and transient (e.g., Cloutier & Macrae, 2008; 
Cunningham, Brady-van den Bos, & Turk, 2011; Cunningham, Turk, Macdonald, & Macrae, 2008; 
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Cunningham, Vergunst, Macrae, & Turk, 2013; Sparks, Cunningham, & Kritikos, 2016; Turk et al., 
2013; Turk, van Bussel, Waiter, & Macrae, 2011; van den Bos, Cunningham, Conway, & Turk, 2010). 
 
Self-Relevance and Object Categorization  
 Whilst significant benefits undoubtedly accrue from the enhanced memorability of items 
owned by the self (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), self-referencing likely exerts 
influence much earlier in the processing stream (Dunning & Balcetis, 2013), thereby setting the stage 
for subsequent judgmental and memorial biases. Take, for example, object categorization. Interaction 
with a complex environment necessitates that an important psychological function of the self is to 
classify objects based on their personal significance (e.g., mine vs. not mine; useful vs. useless; goal-
relevant vs. goal-irrelevant, Berlad & Pratt, 1995; Constable, Kritilos, & Bayliss, 2011; Constable, 
Kritikos, Lipp, & Bayliss, 2014; Fischler, Jin, Boaz, Perry, & Childers, 1987; Folmer & Yingling, 
1997; Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin, 2004; Miyakoshi, Nomura, & Ohira, 2007; Müller & 
Kutas, 1996; Turk et al., 2013). One’s possessions are an obvious case in point, as evidenced by the 
fact that even young children understand the concept of ownership and afford it significant social 
capital (Fasig, 2000; Furby, 1980; Hay, 2006). When the costs of appropriating other people’s 
belongings (e.g., glass of wine) can be considerable (e.g., an unseemly altercation in the bar), the 
ability to discriminate items that one owns (even transiently) from items that one does not (i.e., objects 
owned or assigned to other people) is an invaluable skill (Constable et al., 2011, 2014). As such, one 
might expect self-relevance (i.e., ownership) to facilitate object categorization.  
 Recent research by Sui, Humphreys and colleagues corroborates the contention that perceptual 
processing is sensitive to the self-relevance of stimuli (Humphreys & Sui, 2015; Sui & Humphreys, 
2015). In an associational-learning paradigm, Sui, He, and Humphreys (2012) initially required 
participants to couple arbitrary geometric shapes with person-labels (e.g., circle = you, triangle = best 
friend, square = stranger). Afterwards, in a perceptual-matching task (i.e., do the shape and label go 
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together?), judgments were fastest (and most accurate) for stimulus pairs associated with the self (vs. 
friend or stranger), a phenomenon they dubbed the self-prioritization effect (Sui et al., 2012; Sui, Liu, 
Moverach, & Humphrey, 2013). Sui and Humphreys (2015) further proposed that self-relevance 
triggers prioritized processing by enhancing the perceptual salience of stimuli (see also Humphreys & 
Sui, 2015). What this work reveals is that self-association is sufficient to facilitate the perceptual 
processing of otherwise meaningless items, at least under certain conditions (i.e., perceptual matching 
task).  
 Notwithstanding numerous demonstrations of the self-prioritization effect (e.g., Sui et al., 2012, 
2013), it is somewhat unusual for geometric shapes to serve as a proxy for the self (or indeed any other 
social target) during everyday social-cognitive functioning. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether 
self-prioritization extends to objects encountered and associated with the self under more naturalistic 
processing conditions. Object ownership provides such a context (Cunningham et al., 2008, 2013; 
Sparks et al., 2016). Interacting with objects (e.g., mugs, pens, forks) — some of which are owned by 
self, others of which are not — is a ubiquitous facet of daily life. It may be easier therefore for people 
to categorize objects they either own or have been assigned (even arbitrarily) than identical items that 
belong (or have been assigned) to someone else (Ashby, Dickert, & Glöckner, 2012; Cunningham et 
al., 2008). But if this is the case, how exactly does ownership (i.e., self-relevance) facilitate task 
performance (Humphreys & Sui, 2015; Sui & Humphreys, 2015)? Based on the assumption that 
perception is cognitively penetrable (e.g., Changizi & Hall, 2001; Clark, 2013; Dunning & Balcetis, 
2013; Fecteau & Munoz, 2006; Goldstone, 1995; Lupyan, 2015; Lupyan & Ward, 2013; Shams, 
Kamitani, & Shimojo, 2002; Watanabe & Shimojo, 2001), Humphreys and Sui (2015) contend that 
self-relevance impacts the perceptual operations that underpin decision-making (Humphreys & Sui, 
2015). In the context of object ownership, this suggests that self-owned (vs. other-owned) items should 
benefit from enhanced perceptual processing, such as faster information uptake (i.e., evidence 
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gathering) during decisional processing. That is, a bias in stimulus processing underpins the self-
ownership effect (White & Poldrack, 2014). 
 It is entirely conceivable, however, that self-relevance could affect other aspects of decision-
making, notably response-related processes that are involved when objects are initially encountered 
(Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Firestone & Scholl, 2016; Pylyshyn, 1999). For example, response biases may 
operate via the asymmetric setting of thresholds regarding the quantity of information that is required 
prior to the elicitation of a judgment, such that less evidence is required for responses to the self (i.e., 
mine) than other people (i.e., yours). Egocentrism would precipitate such an effect. If people initially 
assume that everything belongs to them (see Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004), then a response bias 
could also drive the enhanced categorization of self-owned (vs. other-owned) objects (Firestone & 
Scholl, 2016; White & Poldrack, 2014). Of theoretical importance, therefore, is the ability to 
decompose task performance and isolate the specific cognitive pathway (or pathways) through which 
ownership influences object categorization. In the context of binary decision tasks (e.g., self vs. other), 
drift diffusion models provide just such an opportunity (see Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; 
Ratcliff, Smith, Brown, & McKoon, 2016; Voss, Nagler, & Lerche, 2013; Voss, Rothermund, & 
Brandtstädter, 2008; Voss, Rothermund, & Voss, 2004; Voss & Voss, 2007; Voss, Voss, & Lerche, 
2015; Wagenmakers, 2009). 
Decomposing the Self-Ownership Effect 
 Drift diffusion models decompose behavioral data (i.e., response times & accuracy) into a set 
of latent parameters that represent the cognitive processes underlying decision-making (Ratcliff, 1978; 
Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Voss et al., 2013, 2015). A variant of continuous sampling approaches, these 
models assume that information is continuously gathered during a decision phase until sufficient 
evidence is acquired to initiate a response. A schematic depiction of the model is provided in Figure 1. 
The model describes evidence accumulation unfolding over time and fits accuracy and response-time 
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distributions. The duration of the diffusion process is known as the decision time and the diffusion 
process itself can be characterized by several parameters (Voss et al., 2004, 2013, 2015). 
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
--------------------------------- 
 
 The drift rate (v) estimates the speed and quality of information acquisition (i.e., larger drift 
rate = faster information uptake), thus is interpreted as a measure of stimulus processing during 
decision-making (White & Poldrack, 2014). Estimates of drift rate are important in the current context 
given the contention that self-relevance enhances perceptual processing (Humphreys & Sui, 2015; Sui 
& Humphreys, 2015). What this implies is that, during decision-making, drift rates should be higher 
for self-owned than not-owned (i.e., owned by other people) objects. Threshold (i.e., boundary) 
separation (a) estimates the distance between the two decision thresholds (i.e., owned-by-self vs. 
owned-by-other) and defines how much information is considered before a judgment is made. The 
starting point (z) defines the position between the response thresholds (a) at which information 
accumulation begins. If z is not centered between the thresholds (i.e., z = 0.5), this indicates an a priori 
bias in favor of the response closer to the starting point (i.e., less information is required to reach the 
preferred threshold). If a response bias underpins the self-ownership effect (e.g., people are 
predisposed to respond ‘mine’), z should be closer to the response threshold for self than other (White 
& Poldrack, 2014). Finally, the duration of all non-decisional processes is given by the additional 
parameter t0, which is taken to indicate biases in stimulus encoding and response execution (see Voss, 
Voss, & Klauer, 2010).  
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 In any particular task context (e.g., ownership paradigm), there are two ways in which the 
decision process can be biased. These pertain to how a stimulus is processed and how a response is 
generated, with each reflecting a different underlying component of decisional processing (Voss et al., 
2004, 2013, 2015; White & Poldrack, 2014). Whereas variation in stimulus processing affects the 
evidence that is extracted from the item under consideration (i.e., a stimulus bias), adjustments in 
response preparation influence how much evidence is required before a specific judgment is made (i.e., 
a response bias). The theoretical value of diffusion modeling resides in its ability to separate these 
distinct forms of bias (Voss et al., 2004, 2008, 2013, 2015). Accordingly, the current data were 
submitted to a hierarchical drift diffusion model (HDDM) analysis (Wiecki, Sofer, & Frank, 2013).  
 
Experiment 1 
 The goal of Experiment 1 was to explore the effects of self-relevance on object categorization 
— specifically, the emergence of a self-ownership effect during decision-making. In a modified 
ownership task (Cunningham et al., 2008), participants were presented with items (i.e., pencils or pens) 
that ostensibly belonged either to the self or a stranger. Their task was simply to classify the objects 
(i.e., owned-by-self vs. owned-by-stranger) as quickly and accurately as possible. We expected an 
ownership effect to emerge (Sui et al., 2012, 2013), such that responses would be faster to self-owned 
than stranger-owned items. To identify the processes underlying the self-ownership effect, data were 
interrogated using a HDDM analysis (Wiecki et al., 2013). Of theoretical interest was establishing the 
extent to which the self-ownership effect is based on a stimulus bias (i.e., rate of information uptake, v), 
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Participants and Design 
 Thirty-four undergraduates (7 male, Mage = 20.91, SD = 2.02) took part in the research.
1 All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Four participants (3 female & 1 male) 
failed to follow the instructions by responding with invalid key presses, thus were excluded from the 
analyses. Informed consent was obtained from participants prior to the commencement of the 
experiment and the protocol was reviewed and approved by the Ethics Committee at the School of 
Psychology, University of Aberdeen. The experiment had a single factor (Ownership: self vs. stranger) 
repeated measures design.  
 
Stimulus Materials and Procedure 
 Participants arrived at the laboratory individually, were greeted by an experimenter, seated in 
front of a desktop computer, and informed that the experiment comprised an object-categorization task 
featuring two categories of objects, pencils and pens. Next, participants were told that, prior to the 
commencement of the task, the computer had randomly assigned one category of object to them (i.e., 
owned-by-self) and the other category of object to a stranger (i.e., owned-by-stranger). That is, 
participants owned all the items (i.e., pencils or pens) from one of the categories, and a stranger owned 
all the items from the other category. They then pressed the spacebar on the keyboard and text 
appeared revealing who had been assigned the pencils and pens, respectively (i.e., you = pen, stranger 
= pencil). Assignment of the objects to self and stranger was counterbalanced across the sample. The 
experimenter then explained that, on the computer screen, participants would be presented with a 
series of pictures of individual pencils and pens and their task was simply to report (via a button press), 
as quickly and accurately as possible, whether the item belonged to them (i.e., self) or a stranger. 
Responses were given using two buttons on the keyboard (i.e., N & M). Key-response mappings were 
 
1 Based on a medium effect size (Cunningham et al., 2008), G*Power (d = .50,  = .05, power = 80%) revealed a 
requirement of 34 participants for each experiment (i.e., Expts. 1 & 2). 
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counterbalanced across participants and the labels ‘mine’ and ‘stranger’ were located above the 
relevant response buttons.  
 Each trial began with the presentation of a central fixation cross for 1000 ms, followed by the 
picture of a pencil or pen for 100 ms. After each object was presented, the screen turned blank until 
participants reported the owner of the item (i.e., self or stranger). Following each response, the fixation 
cross re-appeared and the next trial commenced. The two categories of stimuli comprised photographs 
of 28 unique objects (14 pencils & 14 pens) that were taken from Google images and edited using 
Photoshop CS6, such that each pencil or pen was oriented obliquely from the left-bottom to the right-
top corner. Images were 140 x 140 pixels in size, greyscale, and matched for luminance. Participants 
initially performed 18 practice trials, followed by two blocks of 112 trials in which all stimuli occurred 
equally often (i.e., 4 times per block) in a random order. In total, there were 224 trials, with 112 trials 
in each condition (i.e., self-owned trials vs. stranger-owned trials). On completion of the task, 




 To explore the effects of ownership on object categorization, participants’ mean reaction times 
were submitted to paired samples t-test (one-tailed). This revealed that responses were faster to self-
owned (M = 522 ms, SD = 79 ms) than stranger-owned (M = 542 ms, SD = 80 ms) items (t(29) = 3.17, 
p = .002, d = .58). In addition, a comparable Bayesian analysis was conducted to ascertain the strength 
of support for the experimental hypothesis (Dienes, 2011). A one-sided test using a Cauchy prior width 
of 1.0 (see Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009) yielded a Bayes Factor (BF10) of 18.71, 
indicating strong evidence for the experimental hypothesis (Jeffreys, 1961; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, 
Borsboom, & van der Maas, 2011). A paired samples t-test (one-tailed) revealed no difference in 
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accuracy between self-owned (M = .93, SD = .09) and other-owned (M = .92, SD = .08) items (t(29) = 
0.82, p = .208, BF10 = 0.26). 
 
Diffusion Modeling 
To establish the contribution of stimulus (v) and response (z) biases to the observed self-
ownership effect (White & Poldrack, 2014), data were submitted to a HDDM analysis. HDDM is an 
open-source software package written in Python for the hierarchical Bayesian estimation of drift 
diffusion model parameters (Wiecki et al., 2013). This approach assumes that the model parameters for 
individual participants are random samples drawn from group-level distributions and uses Bayesian 
statistical methods to estimate all parameters at both the group- and individual-participant level 
(Vandekerckhove, Tuerlinckx, & Lee, 2011). An advantage of this approach is that it is robust at 
recovering model parameters when less data (i.e., experimental trials) are available (Wiecki et al., 
2013). Models were response coded, such that the upper threshold corresponded to a ‘mine’ response, 
the lower threshold to a ‘stranger’ response. Separate drift rates (v) were estimated for self and stranger 
trials (i.e., positive values = drift rate on self-owned trials, negative values = drift rate on stranger-
owned trials). A single starting value (z) was allowed to vary between the thresholds, such that z = 0.5 
indicates no bias (i.e., the starting point is located at the midpoint between the thresholds). Separate 
non-decisional processes (t0) were estimated for self and stranger trials. Bayesian posterior 
distributions were modeled using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) with 10,000 bootstraps 
(following 1,000 burn in samples). Outliers (5% of trials) were removed by the HDDM software 
(Ratcliff & Tuerlinckx, 2002). In this model, a bias could be mapped on to the drift rate (v), indicating 
a stimulus bias; or the position of the starting point (z), indicating a response bias (Voss et al., 2008). 
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--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
--------------------------------- 
 
 To determine the adequacy of this model, three additional models were tested for comparison. 
For the first two models, only the drift parameter (v) or starting point (z) was allowed to vary. For the 
third model, drift rate (v) and starting point (z) were allowed to vary. As can be seen in Table 1, the 
model that included all three parameters yielded the best fit (i.e., lowest DIC value). The DIC was 
adopted as it is routinely used for hierarchical Bayesian model comparison (Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, 
& van der Linde, 1998). As diffusion models were fit hierarchically rather than individually for each 
participant, a single value was calculated for each model that reflected the overall fit to the data at the 
participant- and group-level. Lower DIC values favor models with the highest likelihood and least 
number of parameters. Interrogation of the posterior distributions revealed evidence of a response bias 
during object classification (see Figure 2). Specifically, comparison of the observed starting value (z 
= .67) with no bias (i.e., z = 0.5) yielded very strong evidence of an a priori response bias to the self 
(pBayes(bias  > 0.5) < .001)
2. To investigate whether evidence accumulation (i.e., v) was faster for items 
owned by the self (M = 3.71) than a stranger (M = -3.53), the negative drift rates on the latter trials 
were first multiplied by -1 (see Figure 3). The resultant analysis revealed insufficient evidence for a 
difference between self-owned and stranger-owned items (pBayes(self > stranger) = .230), which was 
also the case for non-decisional processes (t0 - respective Ms: 250ms vs. 260 ms, pBayes(self < stranger) 
= .159). 
Although the three-parameter model was established as best fitting the data (i.e., lowest DIC 
values), statistical tests on drift rate (v) and non-decision time (t0) revealed no differences between 
 
2 Bayesian p values quantify the degree to which the difference in the posterior distribution is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the parameter is greater for self-owned than stranger-owned items. For example, a Bayesian p of .15 
indicates that 85% of the posterior distribution supports the hypothesis.  
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self-owned and stranger-owned items. This suggests that separate values for v and t0 are unnecessary 
and the model that allows only the starting value (z) to vary between the response thresholds should 
yield the best fit. It is worth noting, however, that DIC favors models with greater complexity, hence 
should be used with caution (Plummer, 2008). As such, to further evaluate the best fitting model, a 
standard model comparison procedure used in Bayesian parameter estimation — Posterior Predictive 
Check (PPC) — was performed (e.g., Matzke, Love, Wiecki, Brown, Logan, & Wagenmakers, 2013). 
For each of the models, the posterior distributions of the estimated parameters were used to simulate 
data sets, which subsequently were compared to the observed data. The Mean Squared Error (MSE) 
was calculated to quantitatively evaluate how well each model could reproduce (i.e., fit) the key data 
patterns (i.e., RT and accuracy for self-owned and stranger-owned trials). Lower average MSE values 
indicate less deviance between the predicted (i.e., simulated) and actual (i.e., observed) data. As can be 
seen in Table 1, the model that only allowed starting point (z) to vary yielded the lowest MSE.3 This 
provides further evidence that the self-ownership effect is underpinned by a response bias. 
 
--------------------------------------- 





 Experiment 1 provided evidence that ownership influences the speed of object categorization. 
Compared with pencils or pens owned by a stranger, identical self-owned items elicited faster 
 
3 Across ownership conditions, the difference in mean accuracy between the simulated and actual data sets was extremely 
small (M = 0.1%), nevertheless the entire distributions yielded a sizeable misfit (MSE = .21). This suggests that the best 
fitting model (i.e., z) was either over or underestimating aspects of the accuracy distributions, which may derive from the 
error rates observed across conditions. No such misfit was found on RTs. 
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classification times. This corroborates the demonstration that self-relevance impacts decision-making 
(Sui et al., 2012, 2013). In exploring the origin of this ownership effect, the results of a HDDM 
analysis were informative (Voss et al., 2008; Wiecki et al., 2013). Specifically, ownership mapped on 
to only the response (i.e., starting value, z) parameter of the diffusion model, thereby revealing that 
participants favored responses to the self (vs. stranger) prior to gathering information during the 
decision-making process. In other words, the self-ownership effect was underpinned by a response bias 
(White & Poldrack, 2014).  
Experiment 2 
 Although the results of Experiment 1 are enlightening, a caveat is in order. This pertains to the 
task conditions under which the benefits of self-referential processing were observed (i.e., self vs. 
stranger). At least in the memory domain, processing is routinely advantaged when the self is 
compared with a non-intimate other (e.g., celebrity, politician) or a complete stranger (Kelley et al., 
2002; Macrae et al., 2004; Maki & McCaul, 1985; Rogers et al., 1977). In contrast, when the target of 
comparison is an intimate other (e.g., parent, best friend, spouse) the benefits of self-referencing are 
sometimes reduced, an effect that has been attributed to the familiarity of the target (Symons & 
Johnson, 1997). It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the effects observed in Experiment 1 would 
be sustained under conditions in which the self is contrasted with an intimate other (e.g., best friend). 
Accordingly, we explored this issue in our next experiment. Again, in an ownership paradigm, 
participants classified objects that ostensibly belonged either to the self or another person. On this 
occasion, however, the other person was the participant’s best friend. As before, data were submitted 
to a HDDM analysis to elucidate the processes underlying decision-making during object 
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Participants and Design 
 Thirty-four undergraduates (5 male, Mage = 19.47, SD = 1.26) took part in the research. All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Two participants (2 females) failed to 
follow the instructions by responding with invalid key presses, thus were excluded from the analyses. 
Informed consent was obtained from participants prior to the commencement of the experiment and 
the protocol was reviewed and approved by the Ethics Committee at the School of Psychology, 
University of Aberdeen. The experiment had a single factor (Ownership: self vs. friend) repeated 
measures design. 
 
Stimulus Materials and Procedure 
 Participants arrived at the laboratory individually, were greeted by an experimenter, seated in 
front of a desktop computer, and informed that the experiment comprised an object-categorization task 
featuring pencils and pens. The task closely followed Experiment 1, but with an important 
modification. Specifically, participants were told that the computer had randomly assigned one of the 
categories of object to them (i.e., owned-by-self) and the other category of object to their best friend 
(i.e., owned-by-friend). At this point, each participant was asked to give the name of her or his best 
friend. They then pressed the spacebar on the keyboard and text appeared revealing who had been 
assigned the pencils and pens, respectively (i.e., you = pen, best friend = pencil). As in Experiment 1 
responses were given using two buttons on the keyboard (i.e., N & M), with the labels ‘mine’ and 
‘friend’ located above the relevant buttons. On completion of the task, participants were debriefed, 
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Results 
Object Categorization 
 To explore the effects of ownership on object categorization, participants’ mean reaction times 
were submitted to paired samples t-test (one-tailed). This revealed that responses were faster to self-
owned (M = 566 ms, SD = 95 ms) than friend-owned (M = 593 ms, SD = 110 ms) items (t(31) = 2.80, 
p = .004, d = .49). In addition, a comparable Bayesian analysis was conducted to ascertain the strength 
of support for the experimental hypothesis (Dienes, 2011). A one-sided test using a Cauchy prior width 
of 1.0 (Rouder et al., 2009) yielded a BF10 of 8.23, indicating substantial evidence for the experimental 
hypothesis (Jeffreys, 1961; Wagenmakers et al., 2011). A paired samples t-test (one-tailed) revealed no 
difference in accuracy between self-owned (M = .91, SD = .09) and other-owned (M = .91, SD = .08) 
items (t(31) = 0.08, p = .534, BF10 = 0.13). 
 
Diffusion Modeling   
 To establish the contribution of stimulus (v) and response (z) biases to the observed self-
ownership effect, data were submitted to a HDDM analysis (Wiecki et al., 2013). As in Experiment 1, 
to determine the adequacy of this model, three additional models were tested for comparison. The 
model that included all three parameters yielded the best fit (i.e., lowest DIC value, see Table 1). 
Interrogation of the posterior distributions revealed evidence of a response bias during object 
categorization (see Figure 4). Specifically, comparison of the observed starting value (z = .64) with no 
bias (i.e., z = 0.5) yielded very strong evidence of a pre-potent response bias to the self (pBayes(bias  > 
0.5) < .001). To investigate whether evidence accumulation (i.e., v) was faster for items owned by the 
self (M = 3.17) than a friend (M = -3.00), the negative drift rates on the latter trials were first 
multiplied by -1 (see Figure 5). The resultant analysis revealed insufficient evidence for a difference 
between self-owned and friend-owned items (pBayes(self > stranger) = .235), which was also the case 
for non-decisional processes (t0 - respective Ms: 270 ms vs. 280 ms, (pBayes(self < stranger) = .266). 
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 As in Experiment 1, the three-parameter model was established as best fitting (i.e., lowest DIC 
values) the data. Again, however, statistical tests on drift rate (v) and non-decision time (t0) revealed no 
differences as a function of ownership. Accordingly, we conducted posterior predictive checks to 
further evaluate the best fitting model. As can be seen in Table 1, the model that only allowed starting 
point (z) to vary yielded the lowest MSE.4 This provides further evidence that the self-ownership effect 
reflects the operation of a response bias. 
 
--------------------------------------- 




 Experiment 2 furnished further evidence that ownership influences object processing. 
Compared with pencils or pens owned by a friend, identical self-owned items elicited faster 
classification times, thereby demonstrating a self-prioritization effect on object categorization (Sui et 
al., 2012, 2013). Replicating Experiment 1, this ownership effect was underpinned by a response bias. 
Specifically, participants favored responses to the self (vs. friend) prior to gathering information during 
the decision-making process.  
General Discussion 
 An extensive literature has revealed the effects of self-referential processing on cognition and 
decision-making (Baumeister, 1998; Blakemore & Robbins, 2012; Conway, 2005; Heatherton, 2011; 
Mezulis et al., 2004; Sheppard et al., 2008). When memory is the outcome of interest, items paired 
 
4 As in Experiment 1, the difference between simulated and actual average accuracy was extremely small (M = 0.5%), 
however the entire distributions yielded a sizeable misfit (MSE = .20). No such misfit was found on RTs. 
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with — or owned by — the self are easier to remember than identical stimuli associated with other 
people (e.g., Cunningham et al., 2008, 2013; Kelley et al., 2002; Maki & McCaul, 1985; Rogers et al., 
1977; Sparks et al., 2016; Turk et al., 2011). Put simply, self-relevance facilitates memory function 
(Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Extending this line of inquiry, recent research has 
revealed a pervasive self-prioritization effect in aspects of perceptual processing (e.g., perceptual 
matching), such that association with self (vs. friend and stranger) facilitates the processing of 
otherwise meaningless geometric shapes (Golubickis et al., in press; Humphreys & Sui, 2015; Sui et 
al., 2012; Sui & Humphreys, 2015; Sui et al., 2013, 2014).  
 Further developing research of this kind (see also Macrae, Visokomogilski, Golubickis, 
Cunningham, & Sahraie, 2017; Truong, Roberts, & Todd, 2017), here we demonstrated the effects of 
ownership on object categorization. Across two experiments, a consistent pattern of results was 
observed. First, ownership facilitated object classification whether the target of comparison was a 
stranger (Expt. 1) or best friend (Expt. 2). Second, drift diffusion modeling revealed that this self-
ownership effect was underpinned by a response bias (i.e., starting value, z) operating prior to the 
accumulation of evidence during the object-categorization task (Voss et al., 2004, 2013, 2015; Wiecki 
et al., 2013; White & Poldrack, 2014). In this respect, the current work resonates with recent attempts 
to elucidate how self-referential processing integrates perception and memory (see Sui & Humphreys, 
2015). In particular, how the benefits of self-relevance (i.e., self-enhancement effects) extend to 
perceptual decision-making. By facilitating the binding of material in perception and memory, self-
relevance is believed to bias information processing at various scales of inquiry (Humphreys & Sui, 
2015; Truong & Todd, 2017). As Sui and Humphreys contend, “Self-reference provides a form of 
associative ‘glue’ for perception, memory, and decision making, and through this acts as a central 
mechanism in information processing (2015, p. 719). 
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Influences on Ownership 
 According to a clutch of recent theoretical articles, self-prioritization during stimulus 
processing is a perceptual phenomenon (Humphreys & Sui, 2015; Sui & Humphreys, 2015). Endorsing 
the viewpoint that perception can be modified by characteristics of the observer — including desires, 
values, and goals (e.g., Clark, 2013; Collins & Olson, 2014; Dunning & Balcetis, 2013; Lupyan, 2015; 
Vetter & Newen, 2014) ⎯ self-relevance (e.g., ownership) is believed to exert a comparable influence 
on stimulus processing. According to Humphreys and Sui (2015), through reciprocal connections 
between regions of the prefrontal (i.e., vMPFC) and temporal (i.e., posterior STS) cortices, a Self-
Attention Network (SAN) serves to enhance the visual salience of self-relevant stimuli (see also Kim 
& Johnson, 2012, 2015; Turk et al., 2011). In other words, self-relevance modulates perception.  
Critically, however, not everyone would agree with this conclusion. Instead, a rival viewpoint suggests 
that self-relevance potentially influences non-perceptual stages of the decision-making process, 
notably the adoption of different response criteria when judging self-relevant (vs. non-relevant) 
information (i.e., perception is cognitively impenetrable, see Firestone & Scholl, 2016; Pylyshyn, 
1999).  
 Given these contrasting positions, a primary objective of the current research was to explore the 
extent to which stimulus (i.e., perceptual) and response (i.e., judgmental) processes contribute to the 
emergence of the self-ownership effect using a HDDM analysis (Wieki et al., 2013). In this respect the 
current results were revealing. The self-ownership effects observed in both Experiments 1 and 2 
corresponded to a shift in the starting point of evidence accumulation (i.e., z), but no change in the rate 
at which evidence was extracted from the stimuli (i.e., drift v). That is, ownership moderated 
information-sampling requirements (i.e., self > other) prior to evidence gathering — a pre-potent 
response bias (Wiecki et al., 2013).5 At least in the context of ownership and object categorization 
 
5 Although it is supposed that z is established prior to information sampling, it should be noted that the drift diffusion 
model does not make strong temporal claims regarding when in the decisional process threshold setting (including starting 
point) occurs (Ratcliff et al., 2016). 
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therefore, the current results fail to support the contention that self-relevance modulates the perceptual 
component of decisional processing (Humphreys & Sui, 2015; Sui & Humphreys, 2015).  
 Response biases commonly arise for a couple of reasons: stimulus probability and reward (see 
White & Poldrack, 2014). Manipulations of response expectancy provide a priori information that one 
outcome is more likely than another, resulting in a higher starting value for the frequent response. 
Similarly, shifting stimulus reward also moderates starting values, such that participants are biased 
toward rewarding (vs. unrewarding) stimuli (Ashby, 1983; Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & 
Cohen, 2006; Diederich & Busemeyer, 2006; Simen et al., 2009; van Ravenzwaaij, Mulder, 
Tuerlinckx, & Wagenmakers, 2012; White, Ratcliff, Vasey, & McKoon, 2010). Interestingly, and of 
relevance to the current investigation, self-relevance has been shown to trigger reward in a quite 
different way (Northoff & Hayes, 2011). In a recent article, Krigolson, Hassall, Balcom, and Turk 
(2013) demonstrated that, in addition to self-relevant stimuli (i.e., items owned by self), self-relevant 
responses (i.e., trials on which a ‘self’ response is made) are also rewarding. Specifically, in the 
context of a gambling task in which participants could win or lose prizes for either themselves or 
someone else, Krigolson et al. (2013) revealed that the medial frontal reward system was only 
activated during trials (i.e., bets) accompanied by a self-relevant response. This effect, moreover, 
emerged regardless of the outcome (i.e., win or lose) of each trial. In other words, self-relevant (vs. 
other-relevant) responses were rewarding.  
 Reflecting the operation of an egocentric bias, it is possible that participants in the current 
investigation were similarly predisposed toward the response option that was most rewarding (i.e., 
mine), hence the higher starting value for responses to the self than either a stranger or best friend. 
Although egocentrism is most strongly associated with early childhood (Perner, 1991; Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983), adults continue to think and behave in a self-centric manner. Indeed, one intriguing 
suggestion is that all that separates children from adults are corrective processes that counteract the 
effects of egocentrism. That is, it is not that adults are less self-centered than children, it is simply that 
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they are better able to correct their initial egocentric reactions (Epley & Gilovich, 2004; Epley et al., 
2004). In early childhood, egocentrism and ownership go hand in hand (Cunningham et al., 2012). 
From the age of around 18-24 months, children begin to use possessive pronouns (notably, mine), and 
by 4 years have a well-established understanding of ownership (Hay, 2006). Indeed, disputes over 
ownership account for a significant proportion of sibling and peer conflicts (Furby, 1980; Ramsey, 
1987). In the current work, the drift diffusion analysis provided evidence indicative of adult 
egocentrism. Specifically, the higher starting value (z) for responses to the self (vs. others) suggests 
that participants initially assumed all the objects belonged to them, only later adjusting this belief 
(hence the slowed response times to other-owned items).      
 
Culture and Ownership 
 Rooted in different patterns of self-construal (i.e., independent vs. interdependent), cultural 
factors (i.e., individualistic vs. collectivist) have been shown to exert significant influence on the 
products of self-referential processing, including the ownership effect (Markus & Kitayama, 2010; 
Sparks et al., 2016). Whereas Western cultures emphasize the extent to which the self differs from 
others (i.e., independent self-construal), Asian cultures highlight how closely the self is interconnected 
with other people (i.e., interdependent self-construal), particularly family members (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991). A consequence of this interconnectedness is that the SRE in memory is often 
attenuated, or completely eliminated, among East Asians (Zhu & Zhang, 2002; Zhu, Zhang, Fan, & 
Han, 2007). Interestingly, the self-ownership effect displays similar cultural variability. In recent work, 
Sparks et al. (2016) incidentally assigned objects (i.e., articles commonly available in a shopping 
center) to the self and various others (e.g., best friend, mother) then measured participants’ memory for 
the items. As expected, Westerners showed the typical benefit of self-referencing, such that self-owned 
(vs. other-owned) items were most memorable (Cunningham et al., 2008; van den Bos et al., 2010), an 
effect that emerged regardless of the identity of the other targets (i.e., mother, friend, stranger). For 
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Asian participants, in contrast, the benefits of self-referencing were either eliminated (Expt. 1) or 
completely reversed (i.e., mother > self, Expt. 2). This then raises an interesting and important 
question, how exactly does culture influence ownership? 
 To date, cultural differences in self-referential processing have been traced to the manner in 
which objects are perceived (Kitayama & Uskul, 2011). Whereas Westerners predominantly process 
objects in an elemental, piecemeal way, Asians typically adopt a more holistic strategy whereby they 
exhibit greater sensitivity to the context in which items are embedded (Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 2005; 
Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001, Miyamoto, Nisbett, & 
Masuda, 2006). As a result of these differences in perceptual style (i.e., analytic vs. holistic), Asians 
forge weaker connections between objects and the self, hence the benefits of self-referential processing 
are weakened or abolished (Gutchess, Welsh, Boduroĝlu, & Park, 2006; Sparks et al., 2016). Of 
theoretical interest, here we identified a quite different pathway through which culture may potentially 
impact self-referential cognition — the response-related criteria that Western and Asian participants 
adopt during decision-making. In particular, by minimizing the psychological distance between the self 
and intimate others (Heine & Ruby, 2010; Markus & Kitayama, 2010), Asians may adopt different 
response thresholds during decision-making. Alternatively, if perceptual styles underpin cultural 
differences in the emergence of the self-ownership effect (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001, Miyamoto et al., 
2006), then one would expect the rate of information uptake (i.e., drift rate) to vary between Western 
and Asian participants. Using drift diffusion modeling to decompose the parameters underlying 
decision-making (Wiecki et al., 2013), future research should explore this issue. 
 
Conclusion 
 Although ownership is acknowledged to exert a potent influence on stimulus processing, the 
origin of this effect remains largely unknown. Based on the demonstration that self-relevance 
facilitates perceptual decision-making (Humphreys & Sui, 2015; Sui et al., 2012; Sui & Humphreys, 
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2015), here we showed that ownership enhances object categorization. Compared with items owned by 
others (e.g., stranger, best friend), those owned by the self were classified most rapidly in an object-
categorization task. However, drift diffusion modeling revealed that this self-ownership effect 
originated in the operation of a response rather than stimulus bias (cf. Humphreys & Sui, 2015) — 
specifically, a preference to respond mine (vs. stranger or friend) prior to the accumulation of decision-
relevant evidence (White & Poldrack, 2014). What remains to be seen, however, is the extent to which 
these effects extend to self-referential cognition in other task contexts and among different groups of 
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Table 1. Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) and Mean Squared Error (MSE) Values for Each 
Model (Experiments 1 & 2). 
               DIC         MSE 
Model Vary between stimuli Fixed  Expt.1 Expt. 2  Expt.1 Expt. 2 
1  v   t0, z  -5769 -3320  .025 .032 
2  z   t0, v  -6275 -3711  .024 .030 
3  v, z   t0  -6247 -3816  .029 .036 
4  v, z, t0   -  -6320 -3935  .030 .036 
Note. v = drift rate, z = starting point, t0 = non-decision processes. Fixed z indicates centred starting 
value between the thresholds (z = .5). A DIC difference of 2 is positive evidence for a model, greater 
than 10 is strong evidence for a model (Kass & Raftery, 1995). Lower MSE values are indicative of 
better model fit. 
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Figure 1. Schematic version of the diffusion model adapted from Voss et al. (2013, p. 4). An 
information gathering process begins at starting point z and continues with a mean slope v until it 
reaches an upper (a) or lower (0) threshold. Non-decision processes (t0) reflect how much time elapses 
before/after the decision process. The process durations and outcomes vary from trial to trial because 
of random noise. Outside the threshold boundaries the response distributions are shown. 
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Figure 2. Mean posterior distribution of starting point (z) - Expt. 1. 
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Figure 3. Mean posterior distributions of drift rate (v) on self and stranger trials (Expt. 1). Drift rates 
for stranger have been multiplied by -1. 
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Figure 4. Mean posterior distribution of starting point (z) - Expt. 2. 
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Figure 5. Mean posterior distributions of drift rate (v) on self and friend trials (Expt. 2). Drift rates for 
friend have been multiplied by -1. 
 
